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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
The  literature  on  applications  of the  so-called  “Capability
Approach”  of  Amartya  Sen  and  Martha  Nussbaum  is  extensive,  but
it  is only  recently  that  some  have  argued  that  its  application  to
the  analysis  of  disability  would  be  a  great  advantage  over  existing
analyses,  and  in  particular  preferable  to the  model  of  functioning
and disability  found  in  the  World  Health  Organization’s  Interna-
tional  Classiﬁcation  of  Functioning,  Disability  and  Health  (ICF).  I
argue  here  that  care  must  be  taken  in  this  head-to-head  comparison
between  the  Capability  Approach  and  ICF  since  the  former  is essen-
tially  a political-theoretical  account  of  equalitarian  justice,  whereas
the  latter  is  a model  of  a classiﬁcation  system  for describing  dis-
ability  that  is explicitly  neutral  between  any  theory  of  distributive
justice.  Nonetheless,  this  paper  argues  that  a careful  comparison  of
the  two  approaches  to the  conceptualisation  of  disability  reveals
salient  aspects  of  convergence  that,  arguably,  point  to a  potential
synergy  between  the  Capability  Approach  as  applied  to disability
and  the  ICF.
©  2013  Association  ALTER.  Published  by  Elsevier  Masson  SAS.
All rights  reserved.
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La  littérature  portant  sur  les  applications  de  l’approche  par  les  capa-
bilités  d’Amartya  Sen  et de  Martha  Nussbaum  est  abondante,  mais
ce  n’est  que  récemment  que  certains  ont  soutenu  l’idée  que son
application  à  l’analyse  des  handicaps  présenterait  un  réel  avan-
tage  par rapport  aux  analyses  existantes,  et en  particulier  qu’elle
serait  préférable  au modèle  du  fonctionnement  et  du  handicap  que
l’on  trouve  dans  la  Classiﬁcation  Internationale  du  Fonctionnement,
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du  Handicap  et  de  la  Santé  (CIF)  de  l’Organisation  mondiale  de  la
santé.  Je soutiens  dans  cet  article  qu’une  comparaison  directe  entre
l’approche  par les  capabilités  et  la  CIF doit être  menée  avec  beau-
coup de  précaution,  parce  que  la  première  est  essentiellement  une
analyse  théorico-politique  de  justice  égalitaire,  alors  que  la  seconde
est  un  modèle  de  système  de  classiﬁcation  pour  décrire  le handicap
qui  est  explicitement  neutre  vis-à-vis  de  toute  théorie  de  justice
distributive.  Néanmoins,  cet  article  montre  qu’une  comparaison
attentive de  ces  deux  conceptualisations  du  handicap  révèle  des
aspects  saillants  de  convergence  qui indiquent  une  synergie  poten-
tielle  entre  l’approche  par  les  capabilités  appliquée  au  handicap  et
la  CIF.
©  2013  Association  ALTER.  Publié  par  Elsevier  Masson  SAS.  Tous
droits réservés.
Recent attempts to analyse the concept of disability in terms of the Capability Approach (CA) of
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have argued that this analysis may be preferable to the model
of functioning and disability found in the World Health Organization’s International Classiﬁcation of
Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF) (WHO, 2001) – for example, Mitra, 2006; Trani & Bakhshi, 2008;
Terzi, 2005a, 2005b, 2010; Trani, Bakhshi, Bellanca, Biggeri, & Marchetta (2011). This paper examines
this claim and argues that, once conceptual confusions are set aside and a more defensible relationship
between the Capability Approach and the ICF is constructed, the two  frameworks are independently
justiﬁable, reconcilable and potentially synergetic.
Using the Sen-Nussbaum Capability Theory as a theoretical framework for analysing health in
general, and disability in particular, is understandable since both Sen and Nussbaum have taken this
step, although with different results. The recent work of Jennifer Prah Ruger and Sridhar Venkatapuram
(Ruger, 2010; Venkatapuram, 2011) has demonstrated both the added value and pitfalls of employing
CA to health and health systems research. The same can be said of the application of CA to the concept
of disability.
At ﬁrst blush, however, it might be objected that CA and ICF are not even comparable: the Capability
Approach provides a normative framework for assessing objective well-being (in Sen’s version) or a
political-theoretical account of egalitarian justice (in Nussbaum’s), whereas the ICF does not purport to
assess well-being, or indeed any ethical or political domain, and was explicitly designed to be a model
and classiﬁcation system for the description of functioning and disability, toward the production of
comparable data. The ICF, in short, was designed to be useful for scientiﬁc purposes or normative
applications precisely because it was neutral between any theory of distributive justice, whether
egalitarian or not.
Keeping this in mind, the paper begins with a summary of the basic components of the Capability
Approach, in both Sen’s original and Nussbaum’s later versions. This review is unavoidable since
to move too quickly over this complex conceptual domain would only perpetuate misunderstand-
ings later. An analytic comparison between the ICF analysis of functioning and disability and recent
attempts at a CA analysis of these notions will reveal aspects of convergence and divergence that, I
will argue, make out the case for potential synergy.
1. The Capability Approach
1.1. Sen’s Capability Approach
As initially developed by Amartya Sen (Sen, 1980, 1992), the Capability Approach was not intended
as a general theory of social justice, but rather as a critique of prominent economic metrics of social
equality, and in particular a response to the dominant view of John Rawls that inequality should be
measured in terms of “primary social goods”, in particular income, wealth and the bases of self-respect
(Rawls, 1971). In many of his early writings, Sen uses the approach merely as a formula for making
interpersonal comparisons of objective well-being or welfare, and even decades later he insisted that
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CA is a useful measurement framework, not a theory of social justice. The foundations of CA can be
summarized by three interlocking notions.
1.1.1. Capability
An objective sense of well-being, rather than the economist’s subjective version of utility or
revealed preferences, has the advantage, Sen argued, of avoiding well-known problems of adaptive
preferences (in which people come to take hardship for granted and achieve high levels of satisfaction
despite objective deprivation) and other framing issues that mould preferences and satisfactions in
ways that distort the true state of the individual’s welfare (Gasper, 2007). As Sen states: “It is easy to
see that the well-being of a person must be thoroughly dependent on the nature of his or her being,
i.e. on the functionings achieved. Whether a person is well nourished, in good health, etc., must be
intrinsically important for the wellness of that person’s being” (Sen, 1993: 40). It is also problematic
to analyse well-being entirely in terms of the share of objective resources, or primary goods, a person
has control over, as Rawls has argued (Rawls, 1971). A person with poor health or limited education
will not be able to “convert” income or commodities into the activities and states that constitute the
measure of the objective well-being of the person. Economic and social resources are the means of
achieving freedom and well-being, but they do not account for the extent of freedom and well-being
achieved (Sen, 1992: 81).
The appropriate metric of well-being is neither experienced happiness nor quantities of resources,
rather it is what a person is actually “able to do and to be”, hence social justice must be grounded in
people’s capability to actually achieve what they choose to do, or to become. A person’s capability to
do or be is not the mere opportunity to do so – the state of “negative freedom” satisﬁed when there is
no formal obstacle to achievement, such as a law or social prohibition. Rather, it is a state of realistic,
concrete and practically feasible “positive freedom” in which all that is required in order to do or
become what one chooses is available. Operationally, once a capability has been achieved all that
separates the individual from a functioning is that individual’s range of choice (Sen, 1992: 5).
Over the next two decades, Sen reﬁned the central components of his Capability Approach in a
series of inﬂuential papers (Sen, 1984, 1985a, 1985b, 1987a, 1987b, 1990, 1997, 1998, 1999). At its
core, CA is based on the distinction between functionings as the “beings and doings” a person achieves,
and the set of individual capabilities each of which, if the individual so chose, would become achieved
functionings. The best example of this distinction is one Sen himself uses in several places: imagine
two people who both do not eat enough to achieve the functioning of being well-nourished, but one
is the victim of a famine while the other is on a diet, or a hunger strike as political protest. While
neither is well-nourished, the dieter/protestor has the capability of being well-nourished, if he chose
to exercise that capability. The victim of famine does not have that option, and so lacks a capability to be
well-nourished. Hence: “In so far as functionings are constitutive of well-being, capability represents
a person’s freedom to achieve well-being” (Sen, 1992: 49).
1.1.2. Functionings
Sen kept his central notion of “functionings” purposively vague because, although willing to charac-
terize functionings as constitutive of a person’s well-being, he was reluctant to take the next normative
step and specify what functionings are intrinsically important for human beings, creating in effect an
objective list of essential components of well-being (Sen, 1993). Functionings, as a result, are anything
someone might choose to do or become even if, objectively, they are not valuable doings and beings.
Understandably when arguing for his account, Sen invariably gave positive functionings as examples:
“being adequately nourished, being in good health, avoiding escapable morbidity and premature mor-
tality, etc. [and] more complex achievements such as being happy, having self-respect, taking part in
the life of the community, and so on” (Sen, 1992, 39). Nonetheless, in theory functionings constitute
the sum total of all possible, simple or complex, “doings or beings”. If for policy purposes we  wished
to carve out of this indeﬁnite class a subclass of valuable functionings, Sen thought the only fair way
to do so was by means of democratic procedures (Sen, 1992).
In practice, capability researchers have focused on functionings that include standard devel-
opment indicators (education, income, wealth, housing, water, sanitation, energy, employment,
transport – Klasen, 2000), developmental indices such as the human freedom index, the income-
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distribution index and the human poverty index (Fukuda-Parr, 2003; Fukuda-Parr & Kumar, 2003),
or mixtures of activities and states (low birth weight, asthma, accidents, activity limitation, trouble,
concentrating, disobedience at school, bullying, anxiety, lying, hyperactivity – Phipps, 1999). In his
own extensive empirical development work in the 1980’s, Sen focused on basic functionings of life
expectancy, infant mortality, child death rates, tertiary education rates, medical services and public
health measures (Sen, 1985a), on the well-grounded assumption that these items would get demo-
cratic support (Anand & Sen, 2000; Stewart & Deneulin, 2002; Qizilbash, 2002). Sen has also proposed
an intuitive distinction between basic and non-basic functionings to distinguish essential develop-
ment goals of combating poverty, famine and other basic deprivations, from less urgent social needs
(cf. Alkire, 2002).
1.1.3. Agency goals
The last component of Sen’s original account was his distinction between agency goals and capa-
bilities (Sen, 1985b). Unlike capabilities that constitute a person’s well-being, agency goals are those
objectives that people set themselves, even if they do not beneﬁt directly from them, or indeed even if
they undermine other capabilities. Sen saw that people often have goals that are not in their interests,
such as sacriﬁcing their health or even their life itself for religious, political, or aesthetic achievement.
Adding agency goals to the account serves Sen’s theoretical objective of criticizing welfarist concep-
tions of the good human life, such as utilitarianism, in which only choices that further one’s basic
capabilities are constitutive of well-being. Unfortunately, as commentators have noted, it opens Sen
up to the objection that capability sets may  not be interpersonally comparable, and as such not usable
for assessment of the extent to which a society has satisﬁed the requirements of social justice (Pogge,
2010; Burchardt, 2009; Gasper, 2007).
1.2. Nussbaum and the capabilities approach
In what she prefers to call her “Capabilities Approach”, Martha Nussbaum departs from Sen by
explicitly providing the philosophical foundations for a theory of social justice grounded in basic
human entitlements that justice requires governments to respect and implement (Nussbaum, 2006).
Nussbaum’s version of CA is thus an explicit, although partial, account of egalitarian social justice,
one that ﬁts in the tradition of Aristotle’s account of the ultimate moral goal of “human ﬂourishing”
and Karl Marx’s account of “truly human functioning” in his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts
(1844).
In stark contrast to Sen, Nussbaum focuses on the use of capability as a universal substantive the-
ory of human well-being, robust enough for the metric of social egalitarian justice (see, for example,
Nussbaum, 1988, 1992, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2011). Nor has she shied away from proposing a list
of the Central Life Capabilities constitutive of human well-being: bodily integrity; the senses, imagi-
nation, and thought; emotions; practical reason; afﬁliation (interpersonal association and the social
bases of self-respect); other species; play; and control over one’s environment (political and mate-
rial) (Nussbaum, 2006: 76-8). These capabilities are objective and transcultural preconditions for a life
worthy of human dignity, and together “provide the philosophical underpinning for an account of core
human entitlements that should be respected and implemented by the governments of all nations, as
a bare minimum of what respect for human dignity requires” (Ibid., 70). These capabilities, moreover,
form the content for constitutionally-guaranteed human rights (Nussbaum, 2003, 2006) – the moral
baseline for any just society.
Nussbaum insists that Sen is wrong not to endorse such a list in order to move CA from theory
to political practice. Sen’s background in social choice economics arguably inﬂuenced his decision to
design CA as an open-ended evaluative framework of individual advantage and social arrangements,
and leave the speciﬁcation of capabilities to democratic processes rather than propose, a priori, a
universalistic conception of human good (Robeyns, 2005).
Nussbaum’s version of CA, though philosophical and normative, is not without its empirical appli-
cations as well. Recently Nussbaumian basic capability sets have been the focus of empirical work
to determine, as a precondition for measurement of well-being and social justice, both the robust-
ness of the capability-functioning distinction and whether there is sufﬁcient agreement in surveyed
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populations about why functionings are important (Anand & van Hees, 2006; Anand et al., 2009a,
2009b).
1.3. Capability and health
Health is a basic capability of special importance: “any conception of social justice that accepts the
need for a fair distribution as well as efﬁcient formation of human capabilities cannot ignore the role of
health in human life and the opportunities that persons respectively have to achieve good health – free
from escapable illness, avoidable afﬂictions and premature mortality” (Sen, 2002a: 660). As we  saw,
Sen’s original motivation for CA was that a Rawlsian fair distribution of resources was  inadequate
because it ignores the impact of individual differences such as health in “converting” resources into
well-being (Sen, 1999). The same allocation of income and other resources was  worthless to a person
in ill-health since health problems create additional needs that are costly. For this reason, it has been
argued that it is the arena of health, and by extension disability, in which the battle between Rawlsian
resources egalitarianism and Sen’s capability egalitarianism must be fought (Pogge, 2010; Terzi, 2010).
At the same time, and for competing theoretical reasons, Sen insists that health is only important
if a person actually chooses to be healthy, which he or she may  not if agency goals displace health as a
functioning of signiﬁcance. For her part, Nussbaum has been heavily criticized by disability advocates
for the opposite problem of ascribing too much signiﬁcance to health by elevating it to one of the basic
capabilities, with the implication that someone who was, for example, blind or cognitively impaired,
could not be “truly human” or capable of leading a good life (e.g. Gasper, 1997; Baylies, 2002; Burchardt,
2004). These embarrassments aside, capability theorists, whether in the Sen or the Nussbaum mould,
assume that health capability is both unique and important.
Although he does not count himself a Capability theorist, Norman Daniels has clearly articulated
what it is about health that would make it special for CA or any other measure of the good life: normal
biological functioning – which is Daniels’ operationalization of health – is an essential precondition
for the opportunity for an individual to pursue any goal, aspiration or life plan (Daniels, 1985, 2008).
Meeting health needs, in short, is a social priority as optimal biological functioning is something anyone
would want, both intrinsically and instrumentally as a necessary condition of any life plan. Adopting
language the capability theorists would appreciate, for Daniels, health protects “people’s fair shares
of the normal opportunity range” (Daniels, 2008: 77).
1.3.1. Ruger’s theory of health capability
Over the past decade, Jennifer Prah Ruger has carefully worked out a framework for a powerful
application of CA to health. In Health and Social Justice (Ruger, 2010), she argues that health capability
is a combination of the biological and functional ability to achieve health functionings and, what she
calls “health agency”, an individual’s “ability to engage with and navigate the health system and their
environment to avoid mortality and morbidity and to meet health needs” (Ruger, 2010: 9). Health
agency is Ruger’s reﬁnement of CA based on the observation of Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) who use
CA for a general theory of social disadvantage: the capability to achieve some level of functioning in
any domain must include the capability to sustain that level over time.
Ruger’s principal concern in this elegant book is to survey the essential components of a health
system that can preserve the highest level of health capability in this expanded sense. As she retains
Sen’s focus on individual choice, Ruger allows that some functionings covered by health capability
may  not, for personal idiosyncratic or social and religious reasons be actually valued by some people;
yet, central health capabilities, in particular avoiding premature death and preventable morbidity, can
safely be assumed to be universally valued and chosen by everyone (Ibid, 76-7).
Ruger’s work demonstrates the potential value of CA for a workable protocol for social justice in
health equity. In effect, Ruger’s account of equal access to health generates a core social obligation
to ensure health resources proportional to individual and group health needs, assessed in terms of
the gap between the actual health status of an individual or a group, and the threshold of optimally
achievable good health determined statistically. Throughout, Ruger preserves Sen’s insistence that
social justice requires, not the achievement of good health as such but opportunities to choose to
achieve good health. (By contrast, in another application of CA to health, Powers and Faden reject this
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aspect of Ruger’s account and produce a view much closer to Nussbaum’s version of CA – Powers &
Faden, 2006, 2011).
1.3.2. Venkatapuram and health as a meta-capability
Vridhar Venkatapuram provides a very different account of health capability that falls victim to
a unfortunate tendency among theorists of health of vastly exaggerating the signiﬁcance of health
to human well-being (Venkatapuram, 2011). Venkatapuram argues that the domain of health, more
than merely biological and psychological functioning, includes a person’s ability to achieve all of “life’s
vital goals”. In other words, Venkatapuram conﬂates what health might facilitate in life, with what
health is, ontologically. Beginning with an already expansive normative notion of health from Lennart
Nordenfelt (Nordenfelt, 1987, 2000), Venkatapuram expands the notion of a “vital goal” by adding on
all of Nussbaum’s Basic Capabilities (overlooking the fact that health is one of these Basic Capabilities),
turning health into a veritable summum bonum. With this notion of health in hand, Venkatapuram
further expands the scope of health capability by arguing that a society’s obligations with respect to
its population’s health must be evaluated in light of its responses to every causal antecedents of health
achievement (Ibid., 166). Accepting without discussion the strength of the evidence for social deter-
minants of health, he concludes that every avoidable social inequality (income, community inclusion,
social capital, political, social and cultural equity, and so on) must be remedied in order for us to be
conﬁdent that the population’s fundamental entitlement to health capability has been successfully
secured by society.
Contrasting Venkatapuram’s account – in which the overall social obligation to health is so vast as
to be in principle unachievable – with Ruger’s far more measured assessment of the social obligation
to health capability indicates the range of CA theories of health. It is noteworthy, however, that it
is common ground for all these theorists that health capability, at its core and at a minimum, is a
matter of the achievement of human functionings that we  would normally identify as biological and
psychological human functions – breathing, digesting, thinking, walking, communicating, and so on.
It is in part because of this apparent afﬁnity between the CA sense of “functioning” and our intuitive
notion of a disability as a difﬁculty in functioning, that the application of CA to the conceptualization
of disability has seemed so natural to many authors. Making this step, however, raised the issue of the
relationship between CA disability and disability in the ICF.
2. Capability, disability and the International Classiﬁcation of Functioning, Disability and
Health
2.1. Terminological confusion
Any useful comparison between the application of CA to health and disability and the ICF must
begin with some basic terminological issues which, if ignored, will generate confusion at every turn. It
is worth noting that the fact that the same word is used in very different conceptual schemes (a word
like “functioning” for example) does not entail that the word is intended to mean precisely the same
thing. It is perplexing how often this obvious point is overlooked or ignored.
2.1.1. Functioning(s)
Functionings in CA denote any “doing or being” that could be an object of a person’s choice. It is
difﬁcult to know what is not included in this vague category (except the physically impossible: living
forever or ﬂying without assistance), and a glance at Nussbaum’s Basic Capabilities makes it clear that
functionings can include human activities and states of great complexity. Since the ICF notion of func-
tioning includes biological functions and structures, emotional and psychological states, behaviours
and actions, simple and complex actions, and social roles, the notion represents a subset of CA func-
tionings. The notion of ICF functioning includes both the capacity to do or be and the performance of
the doing and being, whereas capability-functionings are only achievements, “doings and beings” that
actually take place, or in ICF terms, they are performances.
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2.1.2. Disability
In the ICF, “disability” is an umbrella term that refers to impairments of body function and struc-
ture, activity limitations and participation restrictions. There is no “ofﬁcial” CA disability deﬁnition,
but every author who uses the Capability Approach to conceptualize disability follows the common
practice of distinguishing “disability” from “impairment”. In retrospect, the decision by the WHO  to use
“disability” as an umbrella term has caused more confusion about ICF than any other terminological
decision, leading to assertions that, since the ICF “equates disability and impairment” it is pursuing the
medical model, despite its inclusion of environmental factors as barriers (Thomas, 2004). Fortunately,
none of the authors discussed below falls victim to this confusion since they realize that the “dis-
ability/impairment” distinction straightforwardly translates into the ICF “Participation/Impairment”
distinction. (I rely on this ICF rendering of the “disability/impairment” distinction in what follows.).
2.1.3. International Classiﬁcation of Functioning, Disability and Health capacity qualiﬁer and
Capability Approach capability
The ICF “capacity” qualiﬁer was intended to capture the individual’s underlying, intrinsic or “under
the skin” health capacity, a state independent of all environmental inﬂuences, positive and negative.
As such, a person’s capacity in some functioning domain (walking, doing housework, being employed)
was conceptualized as a counterfactual abstraction based on clinical observation – i.e. what this person,
with this health condition and these impairments, could do if the environment was neutralized. The
phrase “in a standardized environment” was  intended to capture a clinical judgment made with regard
to an environment that lacked environmental barriers and facilitators, of the sort that might be in place
in the person’s usual environment. “Performance” is the easier to understand of the pair of qualiﬁers
as it describes what a person does in his or her actual environment – i.e. what this person can be
observed to be doing, or being – or in ICF terms the “lived experience of disability”. When the capacity
and performance constructs are properly understood, the relationship between the basic model of the
ICF and CA disability becomes clear (see Asada, 2007).
Though CA functionings are ICF performances, CA capability clearly extends far beyond ICF capac-
ity. Sen, Nussbaum and most every capability theorists presume that a person’s capability set must
include some sufﬁciently high level of health capacity (not necessarily optimal health, but sufﬁcient
to accomplish the functioning in question). Capability also includes everything else that is required
for a person to actually perform a functioning – the presence of all necessary resources, opportunities
and facilitating environments, and the absence of all barriers. The key to understanding capabilities, to
repeat, is that operationally the only thing that separates a capability for x from the actual functioning
of x is the person’s choice to do (or become) x.
It is worth underscoring the fact that the ICF does not incorporate the ofﬁcial WHO  deﬁnition of
health found in its 1947 Constitution – “Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-
being and not merely the absence of disease or inﬁrmity”. Rather, in the ICF, although this sadly is not
explicitly stated, health is understood conceptually from a measurement perspective as an intrinsic
attribute of a person comprised of states or conditions of the functioning of the human body and
mind (Salomon et al., 2003). As such, health is a determinant of well-being, but not, as the heavily-
criticised, and utterly unoperationalisable 1947 WHO  deﬁnition suggests, coincident with well-being.
In other words, although the ICF seeks to classify for data collection purposes the extent to which
persons experiencing impairments are restricted in their employment, this is conceptualised as the
“lived experience of disability” not as a decrement in health. At the heart of the ICF model is the
axiom that restrictions in employment or education, family life or “activities of daily living” can as
much be created by a person’s environmental context as by the underlying impairment. The 1947
WHO’s deﬁnition utterly conﬂates health and a person’s overall well-being, a conﬂation that is plainly
inconsistent with the ICF model of functioning and disability. (It is less clear what conception of
“health” is presumed by CA authors).
2.2. Stated advantages of Capability Approach disability
Sen has addressed disability primarily in terms of health equity and as a clear example of a prob-
lematic “conversion” characteristic (Sen, 1985a, 1992, 1999, 2002a) – and although Nussbaum devotes
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most of her Frontiers of Justice to disability (Nussbaum, 2006), her discussion too is primarily intended
as an application of a broader theory of justice. The most well-developed versions of CA disability
are those of Sophie Mitra (Mitra, 2006), Lorella Terzi (Terzi, 2005a, 2005b, 2010), Jean-Francois Trani
and Parul Bakhshi (Trani & Bakhshi, 2008; Trani, Bakhshi, Noor, & Mashkoor, 2009; Trani, Bakhshi,
Bellanca, Biggeri, & Marchetta, 2011), and Reindal (Reindal, 2009). These authors also compare CA
disability with the ICF, often ﬁnding the ICF inadequate by comparison. The cited advantages of CA
disability are conceptual, but the fact that CA preserves freedom is also commonly mentioned.
2.2.1. Conceptual
All authors make the point that CA disability is the outcome of an interaction between personal
characteristics, economic resources or assets and the social, economic, political, and cultural environ-
ment (e.g. Mitra, 2006: 241). Impairments, and presumably all health problems (disease, disorders,
syndromes) are “personal characteristics” along with age, gender, race, and psychological traits such
as coping style, sense of control and optimism. All authors are careful to say that having an impair-
ment is a necessary condition of a disability, although some appear to forget this point and slip into
the language of the extreme social model that denies any causative role for impairments in the expe-
rience of disability (Dubois & Trani, 2009; Burchardt, 2004) and, whether intentionally or not, Terzi
suggests that the environment is primarily responsible for disability: “whether impairments do or do
not result in disability depends both on the possible overcoming of the impairment itself and on the
speciﬁc design of the social and physical environment” (Terzi, 2005a: 452).
The distinction between the economic resources or commodities available to the person and back-
ground social and economic environments is a trace element of Sen’s basic account of “conversion
difﬁculties” and his argument against resource egalitarians. Generally, Sen rarely speaks of the impact
of the overall social and economic environment, let alone the physical environment:
A person who is disabled may  have a larger basket of primary goods and have less chance to lead a
normal life (or to pursue her objectives) than an able bodied person with a smaller basket of primary
goods. Similarly, an older person or a person more prone to illness can be more disadvantaged in a
generally accepted sense even with a larger bundle of primary goods. (Sen, 1999: 74).
For their part, social model advocates focus on discriminatory attitudes and social arrangements,
and rarely speak about personal economic resources. As some writers have remarked, CA disability is
an amalgamation of Sen’s analysis of interpersonal conversion variations and the insights of the social
model regarding the role of the background social and attitudinal forces (Qizilbash, 2002; Dubois &
Trani, 2009; Burchardt, 2004). It is on the basis of this feature of CA disability that all authors agree
that the CA better explains why disability is a matter of social justice, and in particular, an issue of
inequality and discrimination (e.g. Terzi, 2005a,b: 445; Reindal, 2009: 163).
Mitra draws out from CA the additional conceptual advantage that disability can be analysed either
as a deprivation of capabilities or of functionings (Mitra, 2006: 241-2). As a deprivation of capabilities,
disability is only potential, since a person would only experience disability if he or she chooses to
pursue a particular functioning, and found – because of impairment, resources or environment – that
that option was closed to him or her. A disability in functionings, by contrast, is an actual disability,
the inability to do or be what the individual has chosen. Other authors put this conceptual point
differently, and identify a major advantage of the CA disability that it recognizes and respects human
diversity, inasmuch as two individuals sharing impairments, personal resources and living in a similar
environment may  nonetheless, because of choice differences, have very different actual disability
experiences (Trani, Bakhshi, Noor, & Mashkoor, 2009). This focus on choice is linked to another that
all authors strongly emphasize, the fact that CA keeps the focus on individual freedom.
2.2.2. Freedom-preserving
Both Sen and Nussbaum were clear that the essential strength of CA is that it identiﬁes opportunities
rather than outcomes as the metric of objective well-being: life goes better when people have more
real and practically feasible choices. As we saw, Sen goes one step further and insists that society
distribute resources and opportunities with an eye toward, not merely the functionings that people
generally desire, but also “agency goals”. Preserving the freedom to choose, even in the context of
health, is at the core of CA (Robeyns, 2005; Ariana & Naveed, 2009). As Terzi puts it: “The focus of
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the capability approach is, therefore, on the real effective freedoms people have and on their choice
among possible bundles of functionings. Ultimately this allows for the pursuit of people’s individual
well-being and facilitates their life-planning on the basis of individual choice” (Terzi, 2005a: 450). This
accords perfectly with the social model in which “liberation from disability is about having choices,
not about living life in conformity to some pre-deﬁned notion of normality” (Burchardt, 2004: 742).
The centrality of choice in CA is also used as a critique of the ICF which ignores choice (or rather,
presumes that everyone chooses to engage in functioning at all levels) (Morris, 2009; Trani, Bakhshi,
Bellanca, Biggeri, & Marchetta, 2011).
Only Mitra sees the problems this raises for the CA analysis of disability. Because “actual disability”
depends on choices, she writes: “Such assessment would be entirely subjective. It would need to be
dynamic and discontinuous because a person may  well adjust to impairment if the person was not
born with it and acquired it later in life” (Mitra, 2006: 241). Unfortunately, that means that it is not
possible to determine, for social and political purposes, the prevalence of disability, or who people with
disabilities are. For practical purposes, she adds: “There cannot be an individual subjective assessment
of disability” but rather “reference needs to be made to a standard that accounts for the context of the
particular individual and other non-impaired persons with similar characteristics (e.g., age, gender),
with the same level of resources, and with the same environment (e.g., urban, suburban, rural)” (Ibid.,
242). In short, again for practical purposes – not merely epidemiology, but for all social policy addressed
to disability – a set of relevant functionings must be established and agreement reached over the
minimal threshold levels for each functioning below which a person would be considered disabled.
When he was required to deﬁne poverty for development purposes, Sen made precisely the same
move (Sen, 1992), although economists continue to object that CA is not useful without more and
more precise operationalization (Coast, Smith, & Lorgelly, 2008). Moreover, as Wolff and De-Shalit
(2007) have demonstrated, CA is simply inapplicable without both a canonical set of functionings and
a common metric and weighting algorithm in order to create a summary score of disadvantage.
CA disability, in fact, must confront a very uncomfortable dilemma: either the element of choice
is preserved and the notion is inherently subjective and discontinuous, in which case it has no eco-
nomic, social and policy applications, or else a set of health functionings is decided upon and, as with
Nussbaum’s objective list, this set of functionings is open to the criticism that it is culturally impe-
rialist (Gasper, 1997), disablist (Baylies, 2002), or at the very least “a very dangerous route to take”
(Burchardt, 2004: 743). It is not enough to say that the ICF does not address the “central aspect of
human life: individual choice” (Trani, Bakhshi, Bellanca, Biggeri, & Marchetta, 2011: 147) if doing
so – in the conceptualisation of disability – has the effect of making it impossible to compare disability
across a population. Sen’s resolution of this dilemma between impractical relativism and dogmatic
objectivism may  well be the only option: using democratic processes to arrive at a list of human func-
tionings that most people agree are constitutive of human well-being, and ignore the aberrant choices
and agency goals of the minority.
2.2.3. Other advantages of Capability Approach disability
Mitra remarks that the CA disability is utterly neutral with respect to the causes of dis-
ability – whether directly from an impairment, the social environment, or from some complex
combination of each. The end result of a deprivation of capability or functioning is all that matters
(Mitra, 2006: 452). Terzi argues that CA disability is merely an aspect of human heterogeneity and
avoids any reference to monolithic judgments about of “normality” (Terzi, 2010: 452). And several
authors cite the direct policy applications of CA disability – for example, the need to expand the range
of data collection to capture the disability experience (Dubois & Trani, 2009), making the case for per-
sonalized eligibility for disability beneﬁts (Mitra, 2006), direct payment approaches to the delivery of
social services (to preserve choice), and underwriting a return to work policy that requires employ-
ers to accommodate the work environment to meet the impairment needs of the worker (Burchardt,
2004).
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2.3. What’s wrong with the International Classiﬁcation of Functioning, Disability and Health?
Anyone familiar with ICF would notice that many of the advantages ascribe to CA are in fact features
of ICF as well: the role of both impairments and environmental factors in the creation of disability, the
impact of personal factors, the universality of disability and the independence of disability from health
condition, or etiological neutrality as it is called in the ICF. While Mitra and others are aware of this and
claim that the ICF framework is the closest to CA disability, they insist that ICF disability is problematic
for a variety of reasons. At the risk of missing nuances in how these critiques are framed, what makes
ICF disability problematic to these authors can be grouped into the following three conceptual and
practical complaints:
2.3.1. International Classiﬁcation of Functioning, Disability and Health does not embody a theory of
justice
Though true, it is not clear why this is a problem for ICF. The CA is a normative metric for both
Sen and Nussbaum – indeed for Nussbaum it is a theory of social justice. ICF was  explicitly designed
by WHO  to be a descriptive tool, a classiﬁcation. As all classiﬁcations must, ICF utilizes a construct or
model for its domain, in this case functioning and disability, a construct that is subject to ontological
constraints. Yet ICF is intentionally neutral with respect to:
• accounts of the processes of disability creation;
• empirical accounts of the principal determinants of disability;
• normative theories that would provide, in a well-ordered society, the moral and social entitlements
of persons with disabilities and the correlate obligations of societies and other agents towards them.
When, for example, Reindal argues that the ICF is deﬁcient because ICF disabilities are analysed as
disadvantages not injustices and forms of oppression (Reindal, 2009: 163), or when Trani et al. insists
that merely describing disability is of no relevance to policy making (Trani, Bakhshi, Bellanca, Biggeri,
& Marchetta, 2011: 147), they are merely pointing out that ICF is a classiﬁcation, not a theory of justice
applicable to disability. Whether experiencing a disability is an injustice or a violation of human rights
is an important question of political and legal theory; but one ﬁrst has to describe the situation as a
disability. Some authors go so far as to argue that because ICF lacks a political motivation its users focus
only on the impairment (and so the medical domain) and simply ignore the environment (Bakhshi &
Trani, 2006; Trani, Bakhshi, Noor, & Mashkoor, 2009, Terzi, 2005a,b), but never offer any evidence of
this.
It is important to emphasise that ICF would indeed be problematic if it purported to be “merely” a
descriptive classiﬁcation but surreptitiously embodied some theory of social justice, or if, somehow,
it could be used to undermine any proposed theory of justice for people with disabilities. But neither
criticism has ever been voiced. Theorists have complained that ICF lacks a robust normative theory
(Imrie, 2004; Edwards, 2005) but their point is not to undermine the value of ICF as a classiﬁcatory
tool, but rather to argue for the need to augment the ICF with such a theory in order to apply ICF to
policy development, a point to which we  can return.
2.3.2. International Classiﬁcation of Functioning, Disability and Health does not incorporate choice
and personal goals
Once again, though true it is not clear why this is a problem with the ICF. It has been argued, based on
Lennart Nordenfelt’s critique of the ICF that it offers an inadequate account of human action because it
ignores intention and volition in its conceptualization of the dimensions of Activity and Participation
(Nordenfelt, 2003). Since for Nordenfelt health is a normative concept that rests on an individual’s
“vital goals”, the achievement of which constitutes the individual’s perception of his or her health, it is
understandable why he views this as a problem for ICF. For his part, Reindel argues that the subjective
perspective is essential since it embodies the values of autonomy and empowerment (Reindal, 2009:
167); Trani and colleagues add that ignore choice is tantamount to ignoring the central individual right
“to choose one’s own existence” (Trani, Bakhshi, Bellanca, Biggeri, & Marchetta, 2011: 147). Finally,
Dubois and Trani argue that the ICF is inadequate because it lacks the transformative focus that shifts
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us from “the speciﬁc aspects of a disabling situation and its consequences in terms of functionings, to
the actual choices and possible choices that a person could have” (Dubois & Trani, 2009: 198). These
are the objections, but they all miss the mark: ICF does not conceptualize a normative theory of health,
and certainly not subjective health. It is a descriptive classiﬁcation.
Moreover, there is a danger in obscuring the difference between objective description and sub-
jective appraisal, a classiﬁcatory tool and a quality of life instrument. Because of this the attempt
to incorporate choice and personal goals into the ICF by means of the undeveloped Personal Factors
dimension of the ICF is misconceived (Rosenbaum & Stewart, 2004; Welch Saleeby, 2007). Whatever
personal factors are, and the ICF is unclear on what they are, they certainly are not actions of choos-
ing, which are activities, nor are they opportunities, which are features of the world describable by
environmental factors.
It is evident why choice is an essential conceptual component of CA – it is a metric of equality
of opportunity, the positive freedom to choose to achieve functionings. Yet, as we have seen above,
the centrality of freedom to choose is the source of on-going problems for CA theorists. Especially in
the context of health, CA is torn between two troubling policy positions: being indifferent whether
a person who chooses to achieve the functioning of being free from AIDS and someone who  has the
opportunity but chooses not to use it; or, adopting an objective list approach and judging a person
who is blind or suffers a chronic health position is not fully human. As we will see below, Sen himself
doubts that an individual’s subjective perception of her or his state of health is not a fair indication of
whether or not their health capability is limited (Sen, 2002b). CA disability, in a word, has problems
of its own accommodating choice and personal goals.
2.3.3. International Classiﬁcation of Functioning, Disability and Health does not distinguish resources
and environments
Mitra has argued that the ICF does not properly identify, or appreciate the important role played
by “resources available to the person”, understood variously in the CA literature as commodities such
as food and shelter, available goods such as assets and income, socio-economic resources in general,
or, in Sen’s phrase, “baskets of primary goods” (Sen, 1999: 74). These resources are to be distinguished
from the “social, economic, political and cultural environment” that includes such broad and systemic
phenomena as unemployment rates, political systems, and cultural attitudes and beliefs (Mitra, 2006:
240). Above we have seen the origin of this distinction within the historical antecedents of CA, but its
rationale is more difﬁcult to discern.
No one would deny that the amount of income a person has, or whether the person has a wheelchair
or other assistive device, is crucial information to determine the kind and level of disability experi-
enced. But the ICF Environmental Factors dimension describes, at whatever level of granularity one
requires, features of the person’s context that function either as barriers – worsening or exaggerating
the impact of a health condition on the lived experience – or as facilitators – improving that experience
by expanding the range and extent of participation. What then is missing in the ICF model?
It might be important to highlight the fact that, unlike ambient economic and social conditions,
resources are owed or otherwise under the control of individuals. In the ICF, we  can use the ﬁrst
chapter of the Environmental Factors classiﬁcation to identify personal consumables, products and
technologies – e 1100 Food, e 1151 Assistive products and technology for personal use in daily living,
e165 Assets, and so on – but we cannot identify the fact that someone possesses these things. Mitra
explains why this is important:
“The possession of commodities is valuable only to the extent that it enables the person to do or
be a range of things. A commodity is considered to have “characteristics”. For instance, for a person
with a spinal cord injury, a wheelchair has the characteristic of providing transportation; it does not
have such a characteristic for a person who can walk” (Mitra, 2006: 238).
Obviously it is important to know, when describing an individual’s lived experience of a health
condition, that he or she owns or otherwise controls the use of a wheelchair, and being able to identify
wheelchairs as physical objects is just not sufﬁcient. Still, being able to construct this narrative and
properly identify the “characteristic” of the wheelchair, while important for an accurate picture of
this person’s mobility participation, is not something that can be plausibly required of a classiﬁcation.
Surely it is enough for the collection of salient data about this individual that “wheelchair” (or rather
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e 1201 Assistive products and technology for personal indoor and outdoor mobility and transporta-
tion) is included, along with information about the background health condition and impairments.
CA disability is an open-ended approach for, inter alia, constructing normatively-informed narratives
about particular individuals in the context of social justice. On the other hand, the ICF is a classiﬁcation
whose primary purposes is to collect saliant data about the lived experience of health conditions. They
are different, and neither can or should be viewed as a failed attempt to serve the purposes that the
other was designed to fulﬁl.
3. Reconciling the International Classiﬁcation of Functioning, Disability and Health and the
Capability Approach
Out of their general enthusiasm for CA several commentators have outlined how an essentially
innovative economic understanding of the social disadvantages and injustices associated with being
poor and powerless can be applied to disability. Their intuitions were sensible: Sen had argued, and
shown empirically, that social disadvantage is not merely lacking economic resources but lacking the
capability to convert those resources into genuine and realistic opportunities to pursue goals and
life plans. Measuring success in terms of the experience of happiness or satisfaction was problematic
because, once again as shown empirically, truly oppressed people have lower expectations of what life
has to offer and good health, expectations that can too easily be satisﬁed (Sen, 2002b). The only stable
measure was the availability of realistic opportunities, that is capabilities, to do or become what one
has chosen. Given the marginal status of many persons with disabilities, and the fact that impairments
create often substantial “conversion difﬁculties” transforming resources into well-being, CA disability
was an inevitable and justiﬁable development.
Much needs to be done to fulﬁl the aspirations of CA disability: a better understanding of the
dynamics of choice in light of the complex phenomena of adaptation and adjustment to impairments;
a resolution of the dilemma of whether it is pure choice, or objective agreement through democratic
processes, that determines which health functionings are central and worth society’s investment; and
a way for comparing, across impairments and health conditions, the common levels of unmet need
that can be metric to determine the composition of resources and environmental modiﬁcations that
can enhance capabilities for persons with disabilities.
Whatever direction the Capability Approach to health and disability takes, however, it will need
stable, valid and comparable data about health and functioning, data that is independent of both
cultural and linguistic variations as well as individual differences in preferences and aspiration.
Making it possible for such important data to be collected, and used, was WHO’s aim in develop-
ing the ICF. A few researchers have argued persuasively that ICF and CA should be jointly used for
disability policy (Florian et al., 2006; Morris, 2009; Siegert & Ward, 2010), and some, despite their
critique of ICF reluctantly allow for compatibility (Trani, Bakhshi, Bellanca, Biggeri, & Marchetta,
2011).
For some policy purposes – data collection for monitoring the implementation of the United
Nations’ Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN, 2006) for example – the case
for bringing together CA and ICF is especially strong, since CA on its own would potentially be both
impractical and counterproductive. Firstly, CA does not provide a feasible data collection frame-
work – it was not intended to – and any attempt to cobble together existing national or international
population data sources, without a “common language” and practical coding framework such as
ICF offers, would be futile. For better or worse, ICF is the international standard for disability and
functioning data collection: it is the only game in town. Secondly, collecting quantitative data about
disability – of the sort required for human rights indicators – could not feasibly incorporate a “choice”
dimension, even assuming that the substantial dilemma about choice described above could be
resolved by CA theorists. Thirdly, a proposal to collect data about the implementation of human
rights that explicitly incorporates a fully-theorised form of egalitarianism could easily be dismissed
as biased. Moreover, using a political theory to operationalize disability is circular: if one deﬁnes
disability as an injustice, then it should be no surprise that data conﬁrming the existence of disability
conﬁrms the existence of injustice.
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The Capability Approach may  well be the best account of distributive justice (indeed, I am strongly
tempted to that view myself); but normative theory is not enough to motivate and effect social change.
It is also crucial to strive for descriptive neutrality, even in the fraught domain of disability. The per-
sistent denial of opportunity, inclusion and full participation in all areas of human life that people
with disabilities experience are not socially-constructed opinions, features of their self-created iden-
tities, or political beliefs, they are demonstrable and objective facts worthy of the highest standards
of scientiﬁc objectivity. Of course, description is not enough; we also need the moral compass offered
by theories of justice and expressed in human rights treaties. With a robust theory of egalitarian jus-
tice, the social response to the needs and rights of persons with disabilities can have solid normative
foundations; but without an objective and common descriptive language of the complex phenomena
of disability, the call for social justice is little more than political rhetoric.
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